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Abstract: This article investigates Russian media influence in Belarus during the second half of 
2010, when an “information war” broke out between Moscow and Minsk. Samples of news content 
are analysed to reveal the varying portrayals of Russia generated by leading broadcasters and 
publishers; interviews with media professionals shed light on the forces which shaped the news. 
The article considers the outcomes of the information war and argues that the impact of Russian 
news exports lay more in their capacity to provoke than their capacity to “elicit attraction” as 
envisaged by the literature on soft power. 
 
Researchers in the field of post-Soviet politics rarely mention the Belarusian media beyond brief 
references to President Aleksandr Lukashenko's “propaganda machine” (Eke and Kuzio, 2000), 
“propaganda empire” (Hill, 2005) or “assaults on media freedom” (Ioffe, 2008). The dominant 
narrative is a simple and depressing tale of “control and repression” (Sahm, 2009): most media 
in Belarus do the state's bidding while independent voices are marginalized. This narrative of 
control and repression is not inaccurate. However, it is insufficient for a full understanding of 
the Belarusian media landscape. There are other dynamics within the Belarusian media system 
which merit attention. This article considers Russian influence on traditional (offline) news 
media in Belarus, a topic which has been neglected in the literature despite its political salience. 
The article begins by outlining the nature, scale and evolution of Russian involvement in the 
Belarusian market for news, identifying partnerships and investments. It then describes the 
“informationwar” (informatsionnaya voyna) which broke out between Moscow and Minsk in 
the second half of 2010. Content analysis is used to expose variation in how Russia was 
portrayed during this turbulent period by 13 different news providers in Belarus, including 
bulletins on the main state TV channels, Russian-owned tabloids and a number of smaller-
circulation independent newspapers. 
The content analysis findings are explained by drawing on more than 20 original interviews 
with journalists, editors and other media professionals who work in Belarus or Russia. These 
interviews shed light on factors which shape reporting about Russia in Belarus, including the 
role played by Moscow-based partners or investors. The final sections of the article reflect on 
what the 2010 information war can teach us about the balance of power in RussianeBelarusian 
relations and the role of the media in Russian foreign policy. The media are frequently 
associated with “soft power” e the power of attraction in international relations (Nye, 2008). 
However, this article contends that Nye's concept of soft power is inadequate to fully capture 
the nature of Russian media influence in Belarus. Pro-Kremlin news providers are undoubtedly 
a tool in Moscow's relations with Minsk but their significance lies as much in their capacity to 
provoke as their capacity to “softly” persuade a mass audience. Moreover, the Russian news 
providers which operate in Belarus are vulnerable in varying degrees to constraints within their 
operating environment. 
 
1. The Belarusian media landscape and the “Single Information Space.” 
Aleksandr Lukashenko assumed office as president of Belarus in July 1994. His desire to 
subjugate the media became clear quite quickly. In December 1994 several of the country's 
state-owned newspapers experienced direct censorship when they attempted to publish a 
report containing allegations of corruption in the Presidential Administration (Eke, 2002; Sahm, 
2009). A number of leading publications saw their editors-in-chief replaced by presidential 
appointees in the course of 1995. Once Lukashenko had tamed parliament by means of the 1996 
constitutional referendum, legislation governing the media became progressively more 
restrictive. A series of amendments to the 1995 Law on the Press and Other Mass Media were 
adopted in the latter half of the 1990s, along with a “barrage” of presidential decrees, 
resolutions, by-laws and changes to the Criminal Code which had an adverse effect on the right 
to free expression (Prina and Pugsley, 2003). As things stand in 2015, it is illegal to defame the 
honour and dignity of the Belarusian president or disseminate information on behalf of 
unregistered organizations, for example, certain opposition groups. No media outlet in Belarus 
can function without an official licence and the state has the power to suspend or terminate the 
operations of any publisher or broadcaster, essentially at will (ZRBOSMI, 2008). Cumbersome 
registration requirements apply to cable TV operators, who must obtain official consent before 
offering any extended package of channels to customers. Satellite TV transmission is harder to 
control, but an article in the Belarusian Code of Administrative Violations stipulates a fine for 
the “unauthorized installation of satellite or other antennas” on facades, balconies, loggias or 
roofs (KRBOAP, 2003). 
Some privately-run publications have been denied access to state-controlled printing presses, 
retail outlets and distribution systems. The toolkit used by the Belarusian authorities to manage 
the media is so extensive it cannot be catalogued here in full; these are just select examples. 
In this highly illiberal context, the Belarusian government's attitude towards the cross-border 
flow of news from Russia has been paradoxical and contradictory. Politicians in both Moscow 
and Minsk have repeatedly endorsed the idea of a “single information space” (yedinoye or 
obshcheye informatsionnoye prostranstvo), implying that citizens of their respective countries 
should enjoy unimpeded access to the same news providers. For instance, Belarusian Minister 
of Information Vladimir Rusakevich said in 2008 that creating a single information space with 
Russia was an important strategic objective for both sides (Embassy of Belarus in the Russian 
Federation, 2008). In some respects, the authorities in Minsk have indeed allowed and 
facilitated Russian participation in their country's media environment. In the period under 
study, two of the most widely read newspapers in Belarus were Komsomolskaya Pravda v 
Belorussii and Argumenty i Fakty v Belorussii. They are subsidiaries of the Moscow-based 
tabloids Komsomolskaya Pravda and Argumenty i Fakty; they carry articles from their parent 
publications alongside a substantial amount of locally-written material. In the period under 
study, three of Belarus's major state-owned TV channels had line-ups based wholly or 
substantially on Russian-made content: ONT (Obshchenatsionalnoye televideniye) was getting 
about 50 per cent of its line-up from Russia's Pervyy Kanal; RTR-Belarus had an almost identical 
schedule to Russia's Rossiya 1; while NTV-Belarus described itself as a “Belarusian state 
commercial TV channel, broadcasting in the Republic of Belarus on the basis of the concept, 
programme line-up and programme content of [Russia's] NTV” (Belteleradiokompaniya, 2013). 
In addition, there are a number of non-commercial media produced under the auspices of the 
Union State of Russia and Belarus for consumption in both countries; these include the satellite 
TV channel TRO-Soyuza (Teleradioveshchatelnaya organizatsiya Soyuznogo gosudarstva) and 
the newspapers Soyuz and Soyuznoye Veche. 
However, it is the abovementioned tabloids and TV broadcasters which carry information from 
Russia to the widest Belarusian audiences. In 2012, each daily edition of Komsomolskaya 
Pravda v Belorussii had a print run of around 50,000, rising to 300,000 for the weekly 
tolstushka (“fat” edition containing the TV guide); its readershipwas around one million 
(Anonymized interviews, 2012). Argumenty i Fakty v Belorussii had a weekly print run of 
roughly 150,000 (Anonymized interviews, 2012). A 2011 survey conducted for the Broadcasting 
Board of Governors found that 45 per cent of Belarusians named NTV-Belarus among their top 
three sources of information; RTR-Belarus was named by 30 per cent of respondents. The 
leading source of information in Belarus was ONT, which broadcasts the Vremya news bulletin 
from Russia's Pervyy Kanal just before its own bulletin, Nashi Novosti. Some 63 per cent of 
survey respondents named ONT among their top three sources of information (Broadcasting 
Board of Governors and InterMedia, 2011). Terrestrial signals of NTV-Belarus reached around 
64 per cent of the Belarusian population in 2013, while RTR-Belarus reached 95 per cent and 
ONT reached 98 per cent (Belarusian Ministry of Communications and Informatization, 2013). 
All three channels were also part of the basic package which cable TV operators are legally 
obliged offer customers at a regulated, state-subsidized tariff eless than a dollar per month in 
2013. 
Such high-profile Russian involvement in the Belarusian media landscape has certain 
advantages for Lukashenko and his administration. It keeps the population happy - Russian 
television programmes and tabloids are well-liked because they often have higher production 
standards than Belarusian alternatives; they also feature more prominent and glamorous 
celebrities. There is a financial reward, as Russian TV shows attract large audiences and 
therefore generate advertising revenue for the Belarusian state broadcasters which carry them. 
Moreover, the accessibility of Russian media reinforces Lukashenko's preferred image as a 
leader who facilitates fraternal relations between the two Slavic nations - an image that 
apparently goes down well with Belarusian voters. 
However, the single information space has had drawbacks for Lukashenko as well. At times, 
reports disseminated from Russia have been less than flattering about the Belarusian regime. 
Back in 1997-1998, unsympathetic reporting by Russian federal channels NTV and ORT (as 
Russia's Pervyy Kanal was then known) led to journalists from those channels losing their 
accreditation to work in Belarus. The Belarusian Foreign Ministry accused ORT's bureau chief in 
Minsk Pavel Sheremet of intentionally distorting information. Sheremet and his cameraman 
Dmitriy Zavadskiy subsequently received suspended jail sentences for filming “illegally” at the 
Belarusian-Lithuanian border; a number of other ORT journalists also spent time in custody 
(Human Rights Watch, 1998). In July 2000, Zavadskiy went missing; it is believed he was 
abducted and murdered (Wilson, 2011). 
During the past decade, Lukashenko has strengthened his defences against Russian information 
attacks. Fewer Russian newspapers are available in Belarus now than in the past, at least in 
their offline format. Important changes have occurred in the way Russian TV programmes are 
transmitted in Belarus. The creation of ONT in 2002 signified the end of full terrestrial 
broadcasts of Russia's Pervyy Kanal in the countrydONT has gradually introduced more 
domestically produced content alongside programmes made in Moscow. For years, the full 
international versions of all major Russian channels (Pervyy Kanal, Rossiya 1/RTR, NTV, TV 
Tsentr and Ren TV) were available on Belarusian cable networks. However, in 2009 Belarusian 
cable operators collectively axed transmission of these five channels (Belapan, 2009). Thus, for 
most Belarusian viewers ONT, NTVBelarus and RTR-Belarus are now the only platforms where 
Russian TV news can be watched. This suits Lukashenko because it facilitates censorship. As 
they are Belarusian state broadcasters, ONT, NTV-Belarus and RTR-Belarus can be instructed to 
drop Russian bulletins (or other unwanted content) from their schedules, or edit out individual 
reports should the need arise. Such censorship was a feature of the information war which 
broke out between Moscow and Minsk in 2010.  
 
2. The origins and escalation of the 2010 information war 
Relations between Russia and Belarus ran into trouble in 2010 for a number of reasons. Until 
the end of December 2009, all crude oil exported from Russia to Belarus was subject to a 
reduced export duty. However, Russia refused to prolong this arrangement, insisting that 
Belarus should pay the full export duty on any Russian oil which it refined and re-exported to 
the West. The Belarusian government naturally objected strongly, because the re-export of 
cheap Russian oil had been a major source of its income. A compromise agreement was reached 
on 27 January 2010, but Lukashenko and his ministers continued to grumble loudly and 
repeatedly. They portrayed the imposition of oil export duties as a “gross violation” of the new 
Customs Union which was due to start functioning between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan 
from 1 July (Belapan, 2010a). 
As the date of the Customs Union's launch approached, there was speculation that the 
Belarusians were dragging their heels over the ratification of key documents in an attempt to 
extract concessions from Russia on the oil supply issue (Belapan, 2010b). On 18 June 
Lukashenko even issued an ultimatum (Belapan, 2010c), stating: “To advance in the formation 
of the Customs Union and sign all documents, all customs duties must be abolished.” However, 
his efforts backfired. On 16 June, Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev instructed Gazprom to 
give Belarus five days to pay off 187 million dollars of gas-related debt. If Belarus failed to pay, 
the gas supply would be cut by 85 per cent; a threat which Gazprom began to implement on 21 
June. Lukashenko capitulated and ratified the new Customs Code by 3 July, but his indignation at 
this “blackmail” was fully vented via the media. For instance, the presenter of ONT's Nashi 
Novosti bulletin accused Medvedev of “cynicism” and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin of 
“hypocrisy” (BBC Monitoring, 2010). At the end of June Lukashenko expressed his resentment in 
a letter to the editor of Russian newspaper Pravda, criticizing the “unfriendly policy” pursued by 
the Russian leadership towards their “closest” neighbour and the “lies and slander” poured out 
by the Russian media (Yezhednevnik, 2010) By this time there was clearly a personal element to 
the bilateral tension. As one editorial put it, “the leaders of Russia and Belarus simply do not like 
each other” (Vedomosti, 2010). The Kremlin was tired of Lukashenko's vitriol and 
intransigence. Besides the disputes over oil, gas and the Customs Union, there was simmering 
irritation in Moscow at Lukashenko's continued refusal to recognise the independence of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Some friction also arose over events in Kyrgyzstan: in April 2010 
Lukashenko publicly criticized Russia for failing to condemn the Kyrgyz protests which had led 
to the overthrow of Kurmanbek Bakiyev (Khodasevich, 2010). He then offered Bakiyev asylum 
in Minsk. Bakiyev's arrival in Belarus presumably occurred with Russian consent since he 
travelled via Russian territory to get there (Zharikhin, 2010). However, the Kremlin had 
generally been supportive of the regime change in Bishkek (Marat, 2010). The fact that 
Lukashenko so openly challenged Russian policy on this matter - and allowed Bakiyev to 
conduct high-profile press conferences – did little to endear him to the Russian leadership. 
Medvedev hinted at his displeasure on 21 April with a pointed reprimand about “offering 
permanent residence to people who have lost their job” (RIA Novosti news agency, 2010). 
Thus, by June the atmosphere in bilateral relations was extremely sour and the Belarusian state 
media were already in offensive mode. However, full-scale information war really broke out on 
4 July when Russia retaliated with an incendiary documentary, Krestnyy Batka (‘Godfather 
Lukashenko’), broadcast in Russia on NTV. Krestnyy Batka accused the Belarusian president of 
despotism, complicity in the “disappearance” of his political opponents, self-interested 
hypocrisy in his dealings with Russia and sympathy for Hitler. It turned out to be the first in a 
four-part series, with further episodes aired on 16 July, 15 August and 8 October. All four films 
were censored from NTV-Belarus, but could be watched in Belarus via the Internet. The 
information war was pursued by both sides until December 2010. Apart from the Krestnyy 
Batka films, other key events included an interview with Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili 
shown by Belarus 1 on 15 July; a news conference given by Lukashenko to Russian journalists 
on 1 October; and a video blog criticising Lukashenko that was posted by Medvedev on 3 
October. 
The following sections describe and explain how Russia was portrayed in Belarus by a range of 
13 Russian-language newspapers and TV bulletins between August and November 2010. The 
findings are based on analysis of a five-week sample of news content and 21 interviews 
conducted with media professionals in Minsk and Moscow. Two research questions are 
addressed: 
1. How did the leading Russian-language TV news bulletins and newspapers in Belarus vary 
with regard to the kind of coverage (extensive or limited, favourable or unfavourable) they 
devoted to Russia? 
2. Why did the scale and tone of news coverage about Russia vary from one Russian-language 
news provider to another? 
Among the 13 news providers studied, six were in some respect Russian: the news bulletins 
Vremya, Vesti and Segodnya were all produced by Russian federal broadcasters before being 
transmitted on Belarusian state-controlled channels; Komsomolskaya Pravda v Belorussii and 
Argumenty i Fakty v Belorussii were both subsidiaries of Russian tabloids; and the weekly 
paper BelGazeta reportedly belonged to the same group of Russian investors as Komsomolskaya 
Pravda v Belorussii. The remaining seven were produced without any notable Russian 
involvement: the state news bulletins Panorama, Nashi Novosti and 24 Chasa; the state-owned 
daily newspaper Sovetskaya Belorussiya; and the privately-owned weekly newspapers 
Obozrevatel, Belorusy i Rynok and Svobodnyye Novosti Plyus. This case selection was designed 
to investigate the hypothesis that a news provider with a shareholder or partner in Russia is 
likely to generate (a) more extensive and (b) more favourable coverage of Russia than market 
rivals. However, the case selection is not representative of all news media available in Belarus. 
Radio, magazines, online media and regional media are excluded from the study, as is news in 
the Belarusian language. The study therefore provides only a partial view of the Belarusian 
media environment. Its scope had to be limited for reasons of feasibility. 
 
3. Reporting about Russia in TV news bulletins 
The six TV news bulletins behaved fully in line with the hypothesis. All news stories were coded 
for whether or not they “featured Russia,” that is, whether they contained three or more Russia-
related keywords from a list in the coding frame. Proportionally, there were far more stories 
“featuring Russia” on Vremya, Vesti and Segodnya than on Panorama, Nashi Novosti and 24 
Chasa, as Table 1 illustrates. 
Thus, variation in scale of reporting about Russia was entirely as expected. Variation in tone of 
reporting about Russia was similarly predictable. Tone of reporting was assessed by comparing 
each bulletin's selection of stories “featuring Russia”. The primary focus of story selection at 
Vremya, Vesti and Segodnya was Russia's ruling tandem: the statements, meetings and other 
activities of Putin and Medvedev received copious and entirely uncritical coverage. Reports 
expressing criticism of Russian state policy were absent, while reports about social or economic 
problems in Russiawere set within the context of the Russian authorities taking steps to 
improve matters. 
The same cannot be said of Panorama, Nashi Novosti and 24 Chasa. These three bulletins 
selected stories which, by the nature of the subject matter, drew attention to injustices, failings 
or errors on the part of the Russian state or problems with the political status quo in Russia. 
Here are a few illustrative examples. On 27 August Nashi Novosti reported a story from 
“authoritative German publication Die Welt” about the career preferences of Russian youth, who 
“increasingly want to become MPs or officials”. The presenter said: “It is not only a stable 
income which attracts the young people…There is a more important reason e corruption…In 
today's Russia this has acquired a horrific scale. According to the data of an association of 
lawyers and human rights activists, a sum equivalent to half the Russian GDP is spent on bribes” 
(Nashi Novosti, 2010a). On 6 October Panorama announced: “The Russian government intends 
to economize on social projects. This concerns the ill, children, and pregnant women… The 
Russian government is counting on saving over 48 billion roubles at the expense of pregnant 
and ill people” (Panorama, 2010a). 
24 Chasa said little about Russian domestic affairs but on 24 August it reported that more and 
more Russian citizens were moving to settle in Belarus. The presenter observed that their 
behaviour was understandable, because Belarus was “more stable” than Russia. Individuals who 
had moved from Russia to Belarus were shown saying that Belarusian food products were 
“better than the same ones in Russia”, and that “people in Russia have to rely only on 
themselves…there is no question of the state helping” (24 Chasa, 2010). 
Denigration of the Russian state, its integrity and competence was a clearly identifiable trend in 
the story selection of Panorama, Nashi Novosti and 24 Chasa during the sample period. Yet 
these bulletins also selected numerous stories about beneficial and positive aspects of the 
Russia-Belarus relationship. For example, they ran reports referring to successful trade and the 
eastward export of Belarusian goods (toys, trucks and food). Regional economic ties were 
emphasized: in the first sample week, Panorama ran a story on trade talks between the 
Belarusian Council of Ministers and Russia's Lipetsk Region, saying that the two sides could 
“complement each other” rather than compete (Panorama, 2010b). All the Belarusian-made 
bulletins covered a meeting between Lukashenko and the head of Russia's Kursk Region.  
 
Table 1 
Scale of reporting about Russia in TV news bulletins. 
TV news bulletin Mean number of stories 
featuring Russia in each 
bulletin 
Mean % of stories featuring 
Russia in each bulletin 
Vremya on ONT 8.22 84.8% 
Vesti on RTR-Belarus 8.56 80.8% 
Segodnya on NTV-Belarus 7.75 82.7% 
Panorama on Belarus 1 2.88 20.8% 
Nashi Novosti on ONT 2.13 23.3% 
24 Chasa on STV 1.36 16.0% 
 
The Nashi Novosti correspondent described relations with Kursk Region as productive, while 
Panorama's correspondent declared on 26 August: “Belarus and Kursk Region are linked by a 
long relationship of partnership and common interests in all areas. This convergence is an 
objective process, not subject to the political considerations of the moment” (Panorama, 2010c). 
Interestingly, the samples of Vremya and Vesti content taken from ONT and RTR-Belarus 
contained no reports at all about Russian-Belarusian relations. This is because such reports 
were cut out by Belarusian censors prior to broadcast. Segodnya was the only Russian-made 
bulletin to get material on bilateral ties past the censors a couple of times. Its reporting pulled 
no punches. On 4 October, a Segodnya correspondent said: “For the first time, the Russian 
leader publicly and harshly responded to the numerous attacks of Aleksandr Lukashenko…The 
Russian president essentially exposed Lukashenko's dishonesty and ugly political bargaining” 
(Segodnya, 2010a). Another Segodnya story on 6 October featured an interview with Russian 
MP Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, who said: “In every way he sabotages all the agreements that are 
reached, behaves despicably. Lukashenko, Lukashenko, that's who he is. Dirty tricks every day” 
(Segodnya, 2010b). 
Meanwhile, Panorama, Nashi Novosti and 24 Chasa all conveyed the words of Lukashenko about 
relations with Russia, including his reaction to the Krestnyy Batka films. Their coverage 
included clips of politicians, pundits and “ordinary Russians” voicing support for the Belarusian 
president. The Kremlin's media attacks were portrayed as backfiring. For instance, on 8 
September the Nashi Novosti commentator Aleksey Mikhalchenko told viewers Some call it an 
information war; I call it free advertising … Visit any Russian internet forum and you will see 
that the stones thrown at Belarus all inevitably fall on Russian soil. They write about the horrors 
of the regime; readers in their comments recall vacations spent happily in Belarusian sanatoria 
and the cleanliness of Minsk streets. They sew funny suits for the Belarusians; the Russians try 
them on their own politicians, making the latter look even funnier... (Nashi Novosti, 2010b) 
There is a straightforward and obvious explanation for the content variation found between 
Panorama, Nashi Novosti and 24 Chasa on the one hand and Vremya, Vesti and Segodnya on the 
other hand. The editors of the former answer to the Belarusian Presidential Administration, 
while the editors of the latter answer to the Kremlin. When interviewed, senior media 
professionals at ONT, Belarus 1 and STV were quite willing to acknowledge that their news 
broadcasts were coordinated with the Belarusian Presidential Administration. For example, an 
interviewee at Belarus 1 said: “We are a national channel and of course we have to defend the 
interests of the state…We carry the state position and convey it. So yes, it happens at the level of 
the Presidential Administration, of course, certain aspects are conveyed to us, which it would be 
desirable to report. And of course, we take them into account in our work” (Anonymized 
interviews, 2012). 
A more puzzling question is why Vremya, Vesti and Segodnya continue to be broadcast on 
Belarusian state-controlled channels even when their message (a rosy-eyed view of the Russian 
authorities) is at odds with Belarusian state propaganda. Three explanations emerged from the 
interviews. First, there are audience expectations. A programmes director at ONT said: “We 
never considered the possibility of removing the Vremya bulletin, because our viewer associates 
our schedule with a number of Russian-produced programmes, including Vremya. I think our 
viewer would be displeased if we took it off air” (Anonymized interviews, 2012). She added that 
Vremya enjoyed a 36 per cent share of the audience in its prime-time slot, which is roughly the 
same as Nashi Novosti, which means that viewers tend to watch the programmes back-to-back. 
She linked Vremya's continuing popularity in Belarus to the common identity and close ties 
which she said were shared by Russians and Belarusians: “Taking into account the long Soviet 
past and friendly ties and relations e many people have relatives and friends living in Russia e 
so the majority see themselves as one country. They continue to think that way” (Anonymized 
interviews, 2012). 
The likelihood of Russian objections is the second explanation. At STV (which controls RTR-
Belarus), a senior representative said 
It is written in our contract that we cannot interfere in that [Vesti broadcasts]. At 
particularly critical moments there were sometimes cases when reports appeared that we 
really didn't like … We replaced them, or rather we didn't replace them; we tried to cut 
out such reports. But firstly that spoilt the timing of the bulletin … And secondly there 
were complaints from our [Russian] partners. Then we decided not to do it. To the purely 
Russian [Vesti] news bulletins we attach our bulletins [10-minute Novosti-Belarus 
bulletins shown at 19.50 before the Vesti bulletin at 20.00]. They are scheduled together 
in order to resolve that issue, to provide a mix of information (Anonymized interviews, 
2012). 
Third, it emerged from the interviews that Belarus effectively relies on the Russian-made 
bulletins to provide news coverage of certain topics. Reporting international stories requires a 
level of resources which the Belarusian broadcasters do not have - their network of foreign 
correspondents is relatively limited. So the Russian bulletins, which have greater resources at 
their disposal, fill the gap. This is particularly true of Vremya and Nashi Novosti. An ONT 
representative explained that the two bulletins are viewed as a single package and Nashi 
Novosti editors avoid replicating topics already covered by their counterparts at Vremya. 
International news with no Belarusian participation is a topic which Nashi Novosti commonly 
leaves for Vremya to report. The interviewee explained 
If Pervyy Kanal reports a story in its news and we understand that it will be a long report, 
then there is no sense for us to repeat it five minutes later with our journalist's 
version…At best we would repeat it, or worst of all, produce a report of poorer quality. So 
we don't. Instead we concentrate more on domestic Belarusian events. For big events 
involving Russia or the CIS we have Moscow assistants, so to speak (Anonymized 
interviews, 2012). 
There were indications that Belteleradiokompaniya (to which both Belarus 1 and NTV-Belarus 
belong) also relies on its Russian partner to provide coverage of international affairs. A senior 
representative of NTV-Belarus observed: “Unfortunately, due to financial restrictions 
Belteleradiokompaniya lacks so-called permanent foreign correspondents. Russia has far more 
of them … Our international news [on Belarus 1] mainly comes from the exchange e video news” 
(Anonymized interviews, 2012). He suggested that the Russian bulletins' capacity to report 
extensively on foreign affairs might partly explain their continued popularity in Belarus. 
Normally, according to the interviewees, reporting of Russian domestic affairs is left to Vremya, 
Vesti and Segodnya. A Panorama journalist stated: “Of course, our viewers can get the fullest 
picture of Russia directly from the Russian news. We understand that perfectly well. So if 
certain events happen in Russia, purely Russian domestic matters, in principle we don't pay 
much attention to it unless it's something big, for example a terrorist attack or an explosion” 
(Anonymized interviews, 2012). The interviews thus suggest that the considerable attention 
paid to Russian domestic problems by Panorama and Nashi Novosti during the information war 
period was exceptional; Belarusian bulletins would tend to talk less about Russian domestic 
matters when bilateral relations are calm. The interviewees from Panorama, Nashi Novosti and 
24 Chasa all stressed that reports about Russia should normally have a Belarusian angle in 
order to be selected. 
 
4. Reporting about Russia in the Russian-language press 
There was support for the hypothesis among the newspapers too, although there was some 
exceptional behaviour among the weeklies and they were all less vitriolic than the TV bulletins. 
Belarusian state-owned Sovetskaya Belorussiya was compared against Russian-owned 
Komsomolskaya Pravda v Belorussii. Table 2 shows that the proportion of stories “featuring 
Russia” in Komsomolskaya Pravda v Belorussii was on average about six percent higher than in 
Sovetskaya Belorussiya. A two sample t-test revealed this difference to be statistically 
significant at the 5 per cent level: t (44) = -3.28; p = 0.002. 
The five weekly newspapers are compared in Table 3. Russian-owned business weekly 
BelGazeta was found to devote the most attention to Russia; the other business-oriented 
publication, Belorusy i Rynok was not far behind. Contrary to the hypothesis, Russian-owned 
tabloid Argumenty i Fakty v Belorussii was found to have the lowest proportion of stories 
“featuring Russia”. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) and the Bonferroni follow-up test 
showed differences to be statistically significant at the 5 per cent level between BelGazeta and 
Svobodnyye Novosti Plyus (p = 0.033); BelGazeta and Argumenty i 
Fakty v Belorussii (p < 0.000); BelGazeta and Obozrevatel (p = 0.003); there was also a 
statistically significant difference in mean between Argumenty i Fakty v Belorussii and Belorusy 
i Rynok (p = 0.006). Differences in mean between Obozrevatel, Svobodnyye Novosti Plyus and 
Argumenty i Fakty v Belorussii were not statistically significant; nor were differences between 
BelGazeta and Belorusy i Rynok. Thus, it was the two business-oriented publications which had 
the most to say about Russia on this measure. 
Tone of coverage was again assessed primarily on the basis of story selection. There were some  
similarities between Sovetskaya Belorussiya and Komsomolskaya Pravda v Belorussii in this 
regard. In both daily papers, Russia appeared most often as a banal place of business, travel or 
residence. There were also noticeable differences between the dailies. Reports about Russian 
problems and failings were far more numerous in Sovetskaya Belorussiya than in 
Komsomolskaya Pravda v Belorussii. Moreover, Komsomolskaya Pravda v Belorussii ran no 
editorials about Russia at all, whereas Sovetskaya Belorussiya was heavily laden with editorial 
opinion. Stories referring directly to the information war were not numerous in either daily 
paper. There were two reports on this topic in the Sovetskaya Belorussiya sample and three in 
the sample from Komsomolskaya Pravda v Belorussii. The range of views cited about the 
dispute was very limited. In Sovetskaya Belorussiya, only the editor-in-chief, one journalist and 
Lukashenko expressed opinions on the matter. Komsomolskaya Pravda v Belorussii cited only 
Lukashenko and Medvedev, without any further commentary. In stark contrast to the TV 
bulletins, both these papers appeared to play down the seriousness of the information war. The 
following illustrative quote comes from a front-page editorial in Sovetskaya Belorussiya: “Now 
lots of people are talking and writing about Medvedev's video blog. But a few days will pass, the 
waters will settle and a number of circumstances will become clearer … political 
misunderstandings between Minsk and Moscow always end positively …” (Yakubovich, 2010). 
The video blog referred to here was a major event of the “information war” in which the Russian 
leader accused his Belarusian counterpart of acting dishonourably and breaking basic rules of 
behaviour (BBC, 2010). 
When reporting the posting of Medvedev's critical video blog about Lukashenko, 
Komsomolskaya Pravda v Belorussii did not take sides. Its coverage consisted of quotations 
from both Medvedev and Lukashenko under subheadings “The people”, “Relations at the top 
level” and “Hopes for improvement”. The words of Lukashenko from his press conference to 
Russian journalists and Medvedev's words from the video blog were alternated without any 
analysis whatsoever. The article was accompanied by a photo of the two presidents together, 
smiling, captioned: “Both Dmitriy Medvedev and Aleksandr Lukashenko are convinced that the 
relationship between the two countries has good prospects” (Kozlik, 2010). 
 
Table 2 
Scale of reporting about Russia in daily newspapers. 
Newspaper Mean number of stories 
featuring Russia in each issue 
Mean % of stories featuring 
Russia in each issue 
Sovetskaya Belorussiya 5.91 19.6% 
Komsomolskaya Pravda v 
Belorussii 
7.17 25.8% 
 
 
As for the weekly newspapers, it is hard to argue that Russian-owned Argumenty i Fakty v 
Belorussii and BelGazeta selected stories that flattered Russia more than the stories published 
in Obozrevatel, Svobodnyye Novosti Plyus and Belorusy i Rynok. In the case of Argumenty i 
Fakty v Belorussii, the majority of stories “featuring Russia” were apolitical. However, the paper 
twice published full-page articles drawing attention to problems in the Russian political system. 
Both were written by the columnist Vyacheslav Kostikov. On 8 September he discussed the 
“alienation” of the Russian public from the Russian authorities (Kostikov, 2010a): 
Reliant primarily on higher-level bureaucrats and satisfied with what is happening in the 
country, the [Russian] authorities are trying to ruin the opposition. In essence the goal has 
been achieved: independent parties have been sidelined and dunce's hats placed on their 
leaders' heads. The words ‘democracy’, ‘democrat’ and ‘human rights activist’ have 
basically disappeared from the official dictionary … The people are told that life is good 
and democracy isn't necessary if there is nanotechnology, good oil prices, Olympic Games, 
football World Cups and jolly television.” 
On 3 November Kostikov then wrote about the Russian middle class's “deep disillusionment” 
with the current political system (Kostikov, 2010b). These two articles constituted the most 
forthright criticism of the Russian state in the Argumenty i Fakty v Belorussii sample, but a 
sceptical attitude towards the Russian establishment could be seen elsewhere in the paper 
every week. 
During the sample period BelGazeta did not run any reports that focused specifically on 
problems in Russia, nor did it pick stories which overtly drew attention to Russian 
achievements or strengths. However, a couple of contributors referred to Russia's democratic 
failings and corruption in the course of discussions on wider issues. For instance, retired 
Russian colonel Vladimir Kvachkov was quoted saying on 1 November (Martinovich, 2010): 
“Compared to the mess in Russia, with the orgy of liberal democracy which killed off almost all 
our own industry, agriculture, science and culture … Belarus is a blessed land.” 
In the area of Russian domestic affairs BelGazeta's story selection centred on the machinations 
and manoeuvring of Russia's political elite. On 6 September, for instance, it ran two full-page 
interviews about Putin's much-publicized road trip around the Russian Far East in a yellow 
Lada. One interview was with Russian journalist Andrey Kolesnikov; the other was with a man 
from Chita whose video of the extra Ladas in Putin's cortege had become an internet hit. 
Kolesnikov was generally sympathetic towards Putin, suggesting that the Russian premier's 
popularity had been boosted by the publicity stunt. The video-maker said he begrudged the 
amount of money spent on Putin's journey. Yet evaluation of Russia's leadership or political 
system was not paramount in any BelGazeta articles. Rather, events and developments 
involving Russia were generally scrutinized for their future implications - particularly for 
Belarus. 
There was a curious contrast between BelGazeta and Argumenty i Fakty v Belorussii in their 
reporting of Russian-Belarusian relations. In BelGazeta, bilateral ties, especially tensions and 
trade, were a dominant theme. Stories relating to the spat between Lukashenko and the Kremlin 
made BelGazeta's front page in three of the five sample weeks. The sample editions of 
Argumenty i Fakty v Belorussii, on the other hand, contained no articles at all that dealt 
specifically with the political or economic relationship between Russia and Belarus. BelGazeta 
did not obviously support either Lukashenko or the Kremlin; it reported diverse views on the 
bilateral tensions, publishing quotes from both Belarusian and Russian politicians. 
In the remaining weeklies, stories containing mockery or explicit criticism of the Russian state 
or its authorities were either rare or entirely absent. Obozrevatel ran one report of note in this 
regard: a full-page article on 27 August about the political consequences of Russia's wildfires. In 
the article, pundit Boris Kagarlitskiy, Russian opposition politician late Boris Nemtsov and 
environmentalist Yevgeniy Shvarts all pointed to flaws in the Russian political system. 
Kagarlitskiy wrote: “The fires revealed the problem of the authorities in a catastrophic 
way…Whenever a problem arises, the ruling circles do not try 
to understand its causes or do something to resolve it. Rather, they brilliantly block any political 
consequences which the given problem might have had. In the long term the results of such 
government threaten to be disastrous …” (Kagarlitskiy, 2010). 
The majority of stories “featuring Russia” in Svobodnyye Novosti Plyus revolved around 
Belarusian socio-political or economic themes. There were no reports that dealt exclusively 
with Russian domestic affairs. Russia was briefly discussed in several interviews with 
Belarusian presidential candidates, none of whom spoke out against ties with Moscow. The 
most substantial analysis on Russia-related topics was written by regular columnist Valeriy 
Karbalevich. Karbalevich produced columns about a Collective Security Treaty Organization 
summit in Yerevan where Medvedev met Lukashenko; an attack on the Russian embassy in 
Minsk; the impact of the feud with Russia on the Belarusian presidential election; and the 
personality clash between the Russian and Belarusian leaders. He described the background to 
these developments and speculation surrounding them; he offered his own interpretation of the 
key newsmakers' objectives and tactics. However, he managed to avoid value judgements and 
emotive evaluations of events. 
 
Table 3 
Scale of reporting about Russia in weekly newspapers. 
 
Newspaper Mean number of stories 
featuring Russia in each issue 
Mean % of stories featuring 
Russia in each issue 
Obozrevatel 7.4 21.0% 
BelGazeta 15.4 37.4% 
Svobodnyye Novosti Plyus 8 24.9% 
Belorusy i Rynok 14 30.7% 
Argumenty i Fakty v 
Belorussii 
10.8 15.5% 
 
Belorusy i Rynok was similarly oriented towards news affecting Belarus in its selection of 
stories “featuring Russia” (the only domestic Russian news story to receive substantial coverage 
was the departure from office of Moscow mayor Yuriy Luzhkov). Trade with Russia was a 
particularly common theme. Sometimes the paper highlighted problematic elements of bilateral 
trade relations (for example, the risk of domestic buckwheat shortages due to rising demand in 
Russia; Belarusian refineries suffering due to Russian oil duties) but it did so without pointing a 
finger of blame. A couple of times Belorusy i Rynok referred to Russia's “imperial’ intentions” 
(Skuratovich, 2010) or “desire to dominate” (Alesin, 2010) in the post-Soviet region. However, 
analysis of Russia's geopolitical manoeuvring occupied relatively little column space. 
Interviews were conducted with representatives from each newspaper to explain these content 
analysis findings. 
At Sovetskaya Belorussiya there was no hiding the fact that the tone of reporting about Russia is 
determined by a strict editorial chain of command running back to the Presidential 
Administration. Speaking anonymously, an interviewee said: “Usually the editor-in-chief goes 
[to meetings at the Presidential Administration], or his first deputy. These meetings take place 
every Monday. And afterwards, each Monday, it becomes more or less clear what the tone of 
reporting about Russian-Belarusian relations is going to be” (Anonymized interviews, 2012). 
However, the editor-in-chief does not just convey instructions from above; he is apparently 
influential in his own right. When asked why Sovetskaya Belorussiya had reacted less strongly 
than the state-controlled TV bulletins to Medvedev's video blog, the interviewee said: “It is all 
connected to [the editor-in-chief's] personality and personal influence on the Presidential 
Administration … He doesn't like the idea of being a reckless propagandist. The people who 
work on TV are younger, they have less influence … The editor of Sovetskaya Belorussiya is old 
and experienced” (Anonymized interviews, 2012). 
At Komsomolskaya Pravda v Belorussii, an interviewee explained why the paper had not been 
more supportive of the Kremlin during the information war. She made it clear that the paper 
tries to avoid aggravating the Belarusian authorities, saying: “With anything concerning the 
[Belarusian] state, we try not to enter into a conflict …Anything relating to ideology we simply 
try to avoid. If there are some really important matters, we simply refer to them in a factual 
tone. Here is one opinion, there is another. Here is one Russian quote, there is a Belarusian one.” 
(Anonymized interviews, 2012). She added that her priority was to keep the paper stable and 
profitable, which would obviously be difficult if it criticized Lukashenko. She said: “Komsomolka 
is a business project … The shareholders' interest lies in having a profitable business in Belarus, 
which operates in a stable way, with a growing readership, so the capital increases … Nobody 
understands this in Belarus, because the attitude towards media here is still the same as it was 
in the Soviet Union” (Anonymized interviews, 2012). 
In both Komsomolskaya Pravda v Belorussii and Argumenty i Fakty v Belorussii, all reports 
about Russian domestic matters are written in Moscow but selected for publication by editors in 
Minsk. According to the interviewee from Argumenty i Fakty v Belorussii, story selection for the 
Belarusian edition is not coordinated with colleagues in the Russian editorial office. Articles 
from Moscow are chosen on the basis of their “relevance to the consumer”; prices and everyday 
life are priority topics, politics “to a lesser extent”. Yet Vyacheslav Kostikov's columns about 
Russian politics (described above) are always selected because “the people love him”. The 
interviewee explained 
Kostikov is always rather predictable, always writes about the same topics, just changing 
the direction or perspective. The people love him. And it works out that in Russia he 
berates the Russians and they let him; he's their own, after all. He is not berating ours 
[authorities], so [changes tack]. But I have to say he is very popular … I think there are 
better journalists, but the people love him, so we always run Kostikov, whatever happens. 
(Anonymized interviews, 2012) 
The mild criticism of Russia's political system observed during the sample period would thus 
appear to be driven more by the preferences of Argumenty i Fakty v Belorussii's readership 
than by political positioning. According to the interviewee, Kostikov is known to be popular 
because his articles are well-read on the paper's website; his columns also generate reader 
responses by phone and letter. 
Although Argumenty i Fakty v Belorussii journalists in Minsk do not write about Russian 
domestic matters, they can produce reports about Russian-Belarusian relations, the interviewee 
said. It is not the paper's permanent policy to avoid writing about bilateral ties e and yet the 
content sample contained no articles on this topic at all. It appears that Argumenty i Fakty v 
Belorussii was choosing not to report the tensions between Moscow and Minsk in an attempt to 
avoid offending anyone. As the interviewee explained. 
We didn't always report [news about bilateral tensions], not always, because of the 
position we are in. Although we are a Belarusian paper to a large extent, we are still 
considered a Russian publication. And we can't say the things a Belarusian newspaper can 
say because from us it would be considered [pro-Russian] propaganda …And Russia for its 
part would see it as Belarusian propaganda... (Anonymized interviews, 2012) 
During the information war Argumenty i Fakty v Belorussii was in an “extremely complicated 
position”. “Both sides were ours [i te i te svoi]”, the interviewee said; consequently the paper 
adopted a “centrist” position. 
Despite the care taken by editors to avoid controversy, Argumenty i Fakty v Belorussii still runs 
into trouble sometimes, the interviewee added. Asked whether articles in the paper ever 
prompted the ire of the authorities in Russia or Belarus, the interviewee said: “It is a never-
ending process. After the publication of each issue, someone always finds something that they 
don't like. With Russia it's simpler to resolve, the editor-in chief resolves it; he explains our 
situation. They don't really understand … Of course, on the Belarusian side it is eternally 
difficult” (Anonymized interviews, 2012). 
Regrettably, no full-time member of BelGazeta's editorial staff could be persuaded to participate 
in this research. The BelGazeta contributor who did consent to an interview was not in a 
position to answer all the questions posed. The interviewee acknowledged that Russia featured 
heavily in BelGazeta's news coverage but could not explain why this was so. She suggested it 
might be due to “the fact that a lot of the journalists have contacts in that area, with Russian 
counterparts”. It should be noted that Viktor Martinovich, the deputy editor of BelGazeta, is 
considered an expert on Russian-Belarusian relations; he is responsible for much of the paper's 
reporting on Russia-related matters and his personal influence may be one reason for the high 
level of attention which Russia receives. The interviewee had not observed any consistent 
editorial stance towards Russia being enforced from above. 
The remaining weeklies - Obozrevatel, Svobodnyye Novosti Plyus and Belorusy i Rynok - are 
each owned by their respective editors-in-chief, who clearly play a major role in determining 
the shape of their publications' news content. Svobodnyye Novosti Plyus is a small operation 
with few full-time staff. Its editor-in-chief Vasiliy Zdanyuk said 
Only I determine [the editorial policy] here. They [referring to the other members of staff 
in the room during the interview] agree. It's all me, only my worldview. Whether that's a 
bad thing or a good thing, that's theway it is. It would be better if there were 10 people 
here who got together and worked out joint decisions. But since there aren't 10 people, 
there's only me, I have to do it. And the reader has to trust me or not trust me. (Minsk, 
October 2012) 
The editor-in-chief at Belorusy i Rynok, Vyacheslav Khodosovskiy, pointed to his control over 
appointments when asked how his own views affected the work of his journalists. He said: “At 
our newspaper the situation is as follows: nobody who supports the [Belarusian] regime will 
come to work here, they wouldn't work and we wouldn't offer them a position at the paper. Our 
newspaper is an opposition newspaper. We are independent.” (Minsk, October 2012) 
The interviewee from Obozrevatel did not go into detail about the nature of owner Sergey 
Atroshchenko's general influence on editorial policy (Atroshchenko is generally considered 
loyal to the Belarusian president). Regarding his views on Russia, however, the interviewee 
said: “The editor-in-chief (he owns Obozrevatel) holds views about Russia which are traditional 
for the majority of Belarusians. He sees Russia as an important strategic partner. I don't think 
articles offending the honour and dignity of Russians would be published … Considered 
criticism in the context of RussianeBelarusian relations is present though” (Anonymized 
interviews, 2012). 
The interviewees from Svobodnyye Novosti Plyus and Belorusy i Rynok made clear that they 
favoured a European future for Belarus over further integrationwith Russia. Khodosovskiy said: 
“We [at Belorusy i Rynok] support a liberal economy, democracy and the values professed by 
most countries in the European Union…By integrating with Russia we are heading towards non-
reform, towards a degrading country, a country which is falling apart, which flouts all 
democratic norms of the law.” 
Zdanyuk, similarly, spoke of Putin's “imperial thinking” and attempts to gradually gather an 
empire “using twenty-first century methods”. Svobodnyye Novosti Plyus columnist Valeriy 
Karbalevich said he considered further integration with Russia to be “wrong and dangerous for 
the prospects of Belarusian statehood and Belarusian democracy”. Both Khodosovskiy and 
Zdanyuk indicated that they tried to convey this wary view of Russia and preference for a 
Europe-oriented foreign policy to their readers. 
Yet it is interesting to note that the comments made by the interviewees from Svobodnyye 
Novosti Plyus and Belorusy i Rynok were far more negative about Russia than any comments 
observed in those papers during the period studied. It seems that neither Zdanyuk nor 
Khodosovskiy favours a proselytizing approach to news reporting and analysis. The content 
sample contained no evidence of either publication engaging in verbal attacks against the 
Russian state or its policies, nor were there explicit editorial calls for any particular course of 
action in relation to Russia. It is therefore not only the personal policy preferences of the editors 
which shape the way Russia is discussed in print. Their views about journalism and the 
objectives they set for their newspapers are also crucial. When asked what role their 
newspapers had sought to play during the media war with Russia, Khodosovskiy and Zdanyuk 
said that explaining the causes and consequences of events had been their priority - a pattern 
observed in the content sample. 
 
5. Outcomes of the information war: did anybody win? 
It is evident from the content sample that the picture of Russia painted by the media in Belarus 
during the 2010 information war was rather contradictory. The bulletins Panorama, Nashi 
Novosti and (to a lesser extent) 24 Chasa portrayed Russia as a corrupt place with many failings, 
incompetent leaders and misguided policies. At the same time, they all stressed the positive 
relationship between “ordinary” Russians and Belarusians and the benefits of bilateral trade. 
Daily newspaper Sovetskaya Belorussiya conveyed a similar, albeit less aggressive and 
sensationalist, message. These four state-controlled news providers apparently had similar 
instructions from the Presidential Administration, described by one interviewee as follows  
I would sit and monitor the news. If a piece of news appeared in the Russian media which 
could be interpreted in various ways - interpreted from a critical point of view - that really 
suited us back then. Above all we were devoting attention to ways of showing that the 
Russian state was corrupt, that the [Russian state-controlled] media were not telling the 
truth, that they were manipulated. It was all necessary to demonstrate that those films 
[about Lukashenko] were a lie. (Anonymized interviews, 2012) 
Meanwhile, Vremya, Vesti and Segodnya were hardly more subtle in emphasizing the 
competence of the Russian leadership and the wisdom of its policies. These three bulletins were 
largely prevented from telling Belarusian viewers anything about bilateral ties; only a couple of 
Segodnya reports escaped the censors to convey the Kremlin's side of the argument. Readers of 
Argumenty i Fakty v Belorussii might have been forgiven for thinking there was no bilateral 
tension, as the tabloid studiously avoided mentioning it. Komsomolskaya Pravda v Belorussii 
played down the significance of the dispute and suggested it would all blow over quickly. Among 
the privately-run newspapers, there was neither condemnation nor approval of Russia's actions 
towards Belarus; journalists at BelGazeta, Belorusy i Rynok and Svobodnyye Novosti Plyus 
focused on explaining the causes of events and predicting their consequences. 
The information war ended when a bilateral deal on oil supplies was reached on 9 December 
2010, just 10 days before the Belarusian presidential election. Russia agreed to drop duties on 
crude oil exports to Belarus, provided that Minsk would transfer to Moscow all the duties it 
received from exporting products made from Russian oil (Dyomkin and Kelly, 2010). 
Lukashenko went on to secure a fourth presidential term in a vote marred by falsifications and 
violence, yet endorsed by Commonwealth of Independent States election observers. What, then, 
did Moscow achieve from its six-month media offensive? Can either side be declared the 
winner? 
We do not know the precise motives behind the Kremlin's campaign against Lukashenko, which 
makes it hard to judge whether it succeeded or failed from the perspective of Russian foreign 
policy. If the aim was to sway the opinion of Belarusian citizens about their president, it was to 
some degree effective. Even though the Krestnyy Batka documentaries were not shown on NTV-
Belarus, roughly half the Belarusian populationwere at least aware of the series by September 
2010. By October (when it ended) around 40 per cent of respondents said they had personally 
watched one or more of the films (IISEPS, 2010a,b). A September poll found that nearly half the 
people who had seen the films considered their content to be “the truth” or “mainly the truth” 
against roughly a quarter who considered it “untrue” or “mainly untrue”; some 10 per cent of 
respondents said their opinion of Lukashenko had fallen as a result of the films (IISEPS, 2010b). 
However, the reality in authoritarian Belarus is that public opinion has a limited impact on 
political outcomes. If Medvedev and Putin were hoping to dislodge Lukashenko from the 
presidency after weakening him through the media, that clearly failed to happen. Wilson (2011) 
describes Russia's policy as “relatively flexible”, with the option of backing post-election protest 
if Lukashenko “suddenly looked vulnerable”. Yet Russia's mudslinging during the election 
campaign had no discernible impact on the position of the Belarusian president. Five years 
down the line, Lukashenko appears just as entrenched in power as he ever has been. It seems it 
will take considerably more than negative media reports to dislodge him from the office. 
It is possible that Russian information attacks against Lukashenko were not aimed at a 
Belarusian audience at all. Russian state television is not capable of precision strikes; the 
Russian authorities cannot isolate one target audience (the domestic one) from another (in 
neighbouring post-Soviet states). One theory put forward to explain the Krestnyy Batka films is 
that the Kremlin wanted to discredit Lukashenko in the eyes of Russian citizens (Sharyy, 2010). 
It does, however, seem likely that there was an element of personal revenge in the Kremlin's 
actions. Korosteleva suggests that Russia unleashed the power of its media “to punish 
Lukashenko for his political disloyalty” (Korosteleva, 2011). If this interpretation is accurate, 
the Russian information attacks were more reactive than strategic; an expression of 
dissatisfaction without any greater purpose. 
Whether Russia derived any lasting advantage from the 2010 information war with Belarus is 
highly questionable. Its own public image in Belarus may have been tarnished by the vitriolic 
response which Krestnyy Batka prompted. Meanwhile, Lukashenko remains, as ever, amenable 
to Moscow's demands only insofar as they suit his personal interests. He is a well-practised 
master at making promises and verbal concessions, only to backtrack later or find new ways of 
extracting rents, evading obligations and minimizing his losses. Thus, Belarus did start 
transferring duties to the Russian budget on the oil and oil products which it re-exported to 
third countries in line with the December 2010 agreement. However, its duty-free exports of oil 
and oil products continued in 2011-2012 under the guise of solvents and thinners e a scheme 
which may have cost the Russian budget over 1 billion dollars (Balmforth and Makhovsky, 
2012). 
 
6. Conclusion. Russian media influence and the power to provoke 
Whatever the objectives and outcomes of Russia's information attacks, they do not fit 
comfortably within the conceptual framework of soft power developed by Joseph Nye. In one 
recent book Nye (2011) defines soft power as: “the ability to affect others through the co-optive 
means of framing the agenda, persuading and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain 
preferred outcomes.” Soft power tends to be closely associated with the mass media, which are 
sometimes described as a “soft power resource” (Nye, 2004). Observers have recently claimed 
that Russian mass media help Moscow to project or exert soft power over neighbouring states 
(Bogomolov and Lytvynenko, 2012). Yet during the 2010 information war, the influence of 
Russian media exports came predominantly from their ability to elicit aggravation in the 
Belarusian leadership rather than attraction among the Belarusian public. Critical reports about 
Lukashenko were far more politically salient than sympathetic reports about Russia; the former 
prompted a furore that was disproportionately large in relation to the number Belarusians who 
actually sawthe offending content. It is possible, if not provable, that favourable portrayals of 
Russia conveyed by Vremya, Vesti and Segodnya may be exerting a subtle long-term effect on 
audience attitudes in Belarus. However, the association between the mass media and soft power 
is based on the premise that public sentiments sway political decision-making (after the media 
have shaped public sentiments). This premise is problematic in authoritarian Belarus, where 
there are few mechanisms through which public attitudes can affect Lukashenko's choices. 
Consequently, the notion that Russian news exports might contribute to Russian foreign policy 
success in Belarus in the manner envisaged by the literature on soft power is problematic. 
Constraints on the Russian media operating in Belarus also need to be taken into account. This 
article has shown that political pressure on the reporting of Russian-owned tabloids in Belarus 
comes more from the local context than from Moscow, while Russian-made TV bulletins are 
subject to direct censorship. 
To conclude, using the prism of soft power to interpret Russian involvement in the Belarusian 
media landscape may be inappropriate. It diverts attention from the Russian media's power to 
provoke; it also obscures the Belarusian authorities' own role in shaping the messages conveyed 
by Russian newspapers and TV programmes. 
 
7. Postscript 
This article was completed in August 2013, several months before the start of the “Euromaidan” 
protests in Ukraine and ensuing crisis in relations between Moscow and Kyiv. The conflict in 
Ukraine has raised the problem of post-Soviet “information wars” to unprecedented 
prominence. Highly tendentious news reports on Russian federal television (widely accessible 
in Ukraine for years via satellite and cable) have been blamed for stoking separatist sentiment 
in Crimea and the Donbas. A relatively liberal media environment arguably rendered Ukraine 
less able than Belarus to defend itself against criticism emanating from Russia. Whereas 
Lukashenko has carefully managed the Russian media presence in his country to facilitate direct 
censorship and encourage self-censorship at times of conflict, the Ukrainian authorities lacked 
an equivalent toolkit to stem the spread of unwanted messages. Belatedly, the Ukrainian 
government has attempted to “counter Russia's media aggression” by establishing a Ministry of 
Information for that purpose (Interfax-Ukraine, 2015), banning the cable transmission of 
certain Russian channels, expelling or barring certain Russian journalists and various other 
measures. Yet Russian broadcasts reportedly continue to attract sizeable audiences in rebel-
held Donbas, where Kyiv no longer controls broadcasting infrastructure. 
As in Belarus 2010, the Russian media during the Ukraine crisis have demonstrated their 
incontrovertible power to provoke and “elicit aggravation”. Indeed, the aggravation elicited in 
Ukraine can be witnessed not only among elite targets of Russian media attacks, but among 
ordinary citizens too, who have fought online to expose disinformation disseminated from 
Moscow (RFE/RL, 2015; DW, 2014). As in Belarus 2010, one should not automatically assume 
that residents of the state subjected to Russian vitriol constitute the target audience of Russian 
“media attacks”. For news editors serving the Kremlin, priority number one is to shape domestic 
public opinion within Russia e the impact of their work on Ukrainian public opinion is a 
secondary concern. Nor should one assume that their impact in Ukraine is beneficial to Russia's 
long-term foreign policy interests. The cases of Belarus 2010 and Ukraine since 2013 both 
reveal the double-edged consequences of aggressively propagandistic messages employed by 
Russia in its “information wars”. Such messages may persuade (or disorient) some viewers 
beyond Russian borders, but they risk alienating and offending many others (including current 
and future elites) - and thus fundamentally undermining Moscow's longstanding goal of closer 
integration with its “fraternal” Slavic neighbours. 
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Appendix. List of news sources included in the study 
Vremya news bulletin on TV channel ONT 
Vremya is a news bulletin produced by the Russian state-owned broadcaster Pervyy Kanal. In 
Belarus it is 
transmitted each night by Belarusian state-owned channel ONT (Obshchenatsionalnoye 
televideniye). 
Vesti news bulletin on TV channel RTR-Belarus 
Vesti is a news bulletin produced by the Russian state-owned broadcaster VGTRK 
(Vserossiyskaya 
gosudarstvennaya televizionnaya i radioveshchatelnaya kompaniya). In Belarus it is transmitted 
each night by the Belarusian state-controlled channel RTR-Belarus. 
Segodnya news bulletin on TV channel NTV-Belarus 
Segodnya is a news bulletin produced by the Russian state-controlled broadcaster NTV. In 
Belarus it is transmitted each night by the Belarusian state-owned channel NTV-Belarus. 
Panorama news bulletin on TV channel Belarus 1 
Panorama is a news bulletin produced and broadcast by the Belarusian state-owned channel 
Belarus 1. 
Nashi Novosti news bulletin on TV channel ONT 
Nashi Novosti is a news bulletin produced and broadcast by the Belarusian state-owned channel 
ONT. 
24 Chasa news bulletin on TV channel STV 
24 Chasa is a news bulletin produced and broadcast by the Belarusian state-controlled channel 
STV. 
Sovetskaya Belorussiya daily newspaper 
Sovetskaya Belorussiya is owned by the Belarusian state. 
Komsomolskaya Pravda v Belorussii daily newspaper 
Komsomolskaya Pravda v Belorussii belongs to the Russian privately-owned publishing 
company Komsomolskaya Pravda. 
Obozrevatel weekly newspaper 
Obozrevatel belongs to Belarusian businessman Sergey Atroshchenko 
BelGazeta weekly newspaper 
BelGazeta's ownership structure is not in the public domain but sources interviewed for this 
study said it 
belonged to the same group of Russian shareholders as Komsomolskaya Pravda v Belorussii 
Svobodnyye Novosti Plyus weekly newspaper 
Svobodnyye Novosti Plyus belongs to its Belarusian editor-in-chief Vladimir Zdanyuk 
Belorusy i Rynok weekly newspaper 
Belorusy i Rynok belongs to its Belarusian editor-in-chief Vyacheslav Khodosovskiy 
Argumenty i Fakty v Belorussii weekly newspaper 
In the period under study Argumenty i Fakty v Belorussii belonged to the PromSvyazCapital 
group controlled by Russian businessmen brothers Dmitriy and Aleksey Ananyev 
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